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NOTES 
IN BONDS WE TRUSTEE:  
A NEW CONTRACTUAL MECHANISM TO 
IMPROVE SOVEREIGN BOND RESTRUCTURINGS 
Robert Auray* 
 
Governments around the world raise significant amounts of capital by 
issuing sovereign bonds in international financial markets.  These bonds 
are typically purchased and traded by foreign investors who seek a 
profitable return on their investment.  The issuing country incurs sovereign 
debt, which it must repay over a predetermined period of time.  
Occasionally, sovereigns—typically emerging market governments—
become unable or unwilling to repay their sovereign debt. 
A country’s ability to repay its debt is difficult to assess given the 
multitude of nonfinancial factors that affect the assessment.  As a result, 
investors are vulnerable to opportunistic defaults which can deprive them 
of their investment.  Additionally, investors cannot collect on their 
investment through bankruptcy proceedings because a country cannot 
declare bankruptcy.  The financial markets have responded to this 
challenge with a variety of contractual mechanisms aimed at facilitating a 
debt restructuring, which will simultaneously lower the sovereign’s debt 
burden while ensuring that investors receive payment on their investment.  
Unfortunately, the contractual mechanisms currently utilized in sovereign 
bond contracts have proven to be inadequate. 
This Note begins by explaining sovereign debt and the major problems 
with the current international sovereign bond market.  Next, this Note 
explores the global community’s various efforts to address these problems 
thus far and explains why these solutions have proven inadequate.  
Ultimately, this Note proposes a new contractual mechanism that provides 
for the creation and use of a new type of trustee to monitor, enforce, and 
renegotiate sovereign bonds. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 2, 2012, NML Capital, a U.S. hedge fund, was granted an 
injunction from the Ghanaian Commercial Court to prevent a 103-meter-
long Argentine naval vessel—the ARA Libertad—and its crew from 
leaving the Ghanaian port of Tema.1  NML Capital is a subsidiary of Elliott 
 
 1. See Drew Benson, Bond Vigilantes’ Ghana Ambush Proves Default Hex Unbroken, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 4, 2012, 5:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-
04/bond-vigilantes-ghana-trap-shows-default-hex-argentina-credit.html; see also Seized Ship 
Crew Back in Argentina from Ghana, BBC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2012, 3:50 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-20078320. 
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Associates—a U.S. hedge fund that owns Argentine debt worth 1.6 billion 
U.S. dollars (USD), dating back to Argentina’s 2001 default.2  Argentina’s 
triple-mast frigate represents a mere fraction of the total amount Elliott 
seeks to collect from Argentina.3 
Elliott has been aggressively pressing Argentina to pay the full value of 
the sovereign bonds that Elliott has held since Argentina defaulted on its 
bonds in 2001 and subsequently issued exchange offerings in 2005 and 
2010.4  At those times, roughly 94 percent of the bonds at issue were 
exchanged.5  The restructurings offered bondholders an exchange at 
approximately thirty cents on the dollar, a 70 percent loss on their 
investment.6 
Unfortunately for Elliott, a United Nations court—the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea—ordered Ghana to release the Libertad on 
December 15, 2012.7  While Argentina appears to be victorious on this 
front, it faces a more costly battle in the Second Circuit.8  In October 2012, 
the Second Circuit ruled that should Argentina make payments to creditors 
who participated in the 2005 and 2010 bond exchanges, and it must pay 
NML Capital and other similarly situated holdout creditors as well, up to 
the full accelerated principle and interest on the defaulted bonds:  USD 1 
billion.9 
The ongoing struggle between a hedge fund and a sovereign nation is 
illustrative of the chaotic process countries typically encounter when they 
restructure their sovereign bonds.  This Note suggests a new contractual 
mechanism that should be included in sovereign bond contracts that will 
bring order to the tumultuous restructuring process.  Part I of this Note 
provides background information about debt, sovereign bonds, and the 
major problems with the current restructurings system.  Next, Part II 
explores the failures of the current contractual mechanisms.  Finally, Part 
 
 2. See Benson, supra note 1; Argy-Bargy, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2012, at 80, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21567386-argy-bargy. 
 3. See Benson, supra note 1; Seized Ship Crew Back in Argentina from Ghana, supra 
note 1 (“The fund, NML Capital, argued it was owed [USD 370 million] as a result of 
Argentina’s debt default a decade ago.  It is seeking [USD 20 million] in return for the 
release of the ship, a three-masted training vessel.”). 
 4. See Benson, supra note 1; see also infra notes 159–84, and accompanying text. 
 5. See Benson, supra note 1; see also infra notes 304–13, and accompanying text. 
 6. See Benson, supra note 1; Seized Ship Crew Back in Argentina from Ghana, supra 
note 1. 
 7. See Jude Webber & Xan Rice, UN Tells Ghana To Release Argentine Ship, FIN. 
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f9b1dd84-46db-11e2-8b2f-
00144feab49a.html#axzz2GSgDetmR. 
 8. See generally NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., Nos. 12-4694, 12-4865, 2013 
WL 4487563 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013); see also Jude Webber & Robin Wigglesworth, 
Bondholders Add Twist to Argentine Debt Spat, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2012), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/181ccd5c-50c2-11e2-9623-00144feab49a.html
#axzz2HQpX9ZKy; Webber & Rice, supra note 7. 
 9. See NML Capital, 2013 WL 4487563, at *11; NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of 
Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 263 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, No. 12-1494, 2013 WL 3211846 (U.S. 
Oct. 7, 2013); see also Anna Gelpern, Pari Passu Wipeout in the Southern District, CREDIT 
SLIPS (Nov. 25, 2012, 11:56 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/11/pari-passu-
wipeout-in-the-southern-district.html. 
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III offers a new mechanism for addressing the systemic difficulties inherent 
in sovereign bond restructurings. 
I.  FROM MECHANISMS TO COLLECTIVES:  THE CURRENT STATE OF 
SOVEREIGN BOND RESTRUCTURINGS 
Before analyzing the challenges that arise during restructurings, this Note 
provides background information about sovereign bonds.  Part I.A begins 
with a basic overview of sovereign bonds and defines the relevant 
terminology.  Part I.B discusses the qualities that make sovereign bonds 
unique.  Next, Part I.C examines the reasons countries may be reluctant to 
initiate a bond restructuring.  Finally, Part I.D evaluates the problems with 
restructurings and explores the various efforts of the international 
community and the bond market to resolve them. 
A.  The Basics of Bonds and Sovereign Bonds 
Any study of sovereign bond restructurings must begin with an 
understanding of the relevant subject matter.  Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines a bond as an obligation or a promise; more specifically, a written 
promise to pay money after a certain time elapses.10  The date when the full 
payment is due is referred to as the date of maturity.11  Bonds are a type of 
debt instrument, meaning they are a type of written legal document that 
defines rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities.12  The purchaser of a 
bond—the investor or creditor—is essentially loaning money to the 
issuer—the debtor—for a fixed period of time.13 
In return for their purchase, investors receive a guarantee that they will 
have the principal14 amount repaid by a certain future date, and that they 
will receive interest payments at certain intervals.15  The amount of interest 
the bond is going to pay on the basis of predetermined intervals, stated in 
percentage terms, is known as the coupon rate.16  The details pertaining to 
the expected repayment, including the interest rate, are laid out in the bond 
contract, also known as a bond indenture.17 
 
 10. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 200 (9th ed. 2009); see also MARK MOBIUS, BONDS:  
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORE CONCEPTS 2 (1st ed. 2012) (“Bonds are basically long-term 
IOUs between a borrower and a lender.”). 
 11. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 452; see also MOBIUS, supra note 
10, at 4. 
 12. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 869. 
 13. See MOBIUS, supra note 10, at 2. 
 14. Principal is “[t]he amount of a debt, investment, or other fund, not including interest, 
earnings, or profits.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1312. 
 15. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 869; see also MOBIUS, supra note 
10, at 2–3. 
 16. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 888; see also MOBIUS, supra note 
10, at 3. 
 17. See MOBIUS, supra note 10, at 3. 
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The face value of a bond reflects its dollar value at the time it is to be 
repaid—typically the principal plus the total interest.18  However, the face 
value of a bond is not necessarily equal to its price.19  Bonds are often 
traded on the secondary market before they reach maturity,20 so the price 
may change in response to a number of factors, including the rise and fall of 
interest rates and the credit quality of the debtor.21  The risk that a debtor 
will default22 on its bonds can also lower the price of the bonds on the 
market.23 
Sovereign debt is debt that governments incur (typically, the 
governments of developing countries) to foreign investors seeking a 
profitable return.24  This definition of sovereign debt includes funds raised 
abroad through the issuance of bonds in foreign capital markets.25  
Sovereign debt allows governments to borrow substantial capital.26  
Governments typically repay much of what they borrow.27  However, 
repayment can be complicated and often involves delays, renegotiations, 
public intervention, default, and restructuring.28 
When sovereigns are unable to repay what they borrow, they may enter 
into what is known as a sovereign debt restructuring.29  A sovereign debt 
restructuring is a legal process involving the exchange of outstanding 
sovereign debt, usually in the form of loans or bonds, for new debt 
instruments or cash.30  Sovereigns typically restructure after they default on 
 
 18. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 888; see also MOBIUS, supra note 
10, at 3. 
 19. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 888; see also MOBIUS, supra note 
10, at 3. 
 20. Maturity is the date on which the principal is paid back and the last interest payment 
is made. MOBIUS, supra note 10, at 4. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Default is “the failure to pay a debt when due.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 10, at 480. 
 23. See MOBIUS, supra note 10, at 51. 
 24. See Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, Sovereign Debt 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 5131, 1995), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w5131.pdf. 
 25. See supra notes 12–21 and accompanying text; see also MOBIUS, supra note 10, at 3; 
Eaton & Fernandez, supra note 24, at 1. 
 26. See Eaton & Fernandez, supra note 24, at 1; see also Alinna Arora & Rodrigo 
Olivares Caminal, Rethinking the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Approach, 9 L. & BUS. REV. 
AM. 629, 629 (2003) (“Debt has been the largest source of capital flow to developing 
countries in the past fifty years.”). 
 27. See Eaton & Fernandez, supra note 24, at 1; see also Brian Perry, Are Sovereign 
Bonds Worth the Risk?, FORBES (June 21, 2011, 3:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
investor/2011/06/21/are-sovereign-bonds-worth-the-risk/. 
 28. See Eaton & Fernandez, supra note 24, at 1. 
 29. See Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 630. 
 30. See Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings 1950–2010:  Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 7 (IMF Working 
Grp., Monetary & Capital Mkts. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 12/203, 2012), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf; see also Arora & Caminal, 
supra note 26, at 630. 
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their debt.31  A restructuring that takes place after a sovereign has defaulted 
is known as a post-default restructuring.32  When a sovereign defaults, its 
debt payments are usually accelerated33—meaning creditors are entitled to 
immediate and full repayment of the face value of the debt.34 
There are generally two main elements in a debt restructuring:  debt 
rescheduling and debt reduction.35  A debt rescheduling lengthens the 
maturities of the old debt, which may also entail a decrease in interest 
rates.36  Debt reschedulings are considered a type of debt relief because 
they shift payments into the future.37  Debt reduction is a reduction in the 
face value of the old instruments.38  Both debt reschedulings and debt 
reductions can involve a “haircut,” which is a loss in the face value of the 
creditors’ claims.39  This Note focuses on distressed bond restructurings, 
which are restructurings at terms that are less favorable than the original 
bond terms.40  Specifically, this Note is concerned with debt restructurings 
with foreign private bondholders. 
Sovereign debt has vacillated between bank lending and bond lending 
over the last two centuries.41  In the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, sovereign debt was primarily in the form of bond lending.42  
Following that period, and up until the 1990s, medium- and long-term bank 
loan agreements made up the majority of sovereign debt.43  Since the 
1990s, the majority of sovereign debt is once again in the form of bond 
debt.44  International bonds are typically issued in financial centers, under 
 
 31. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 8; see also Arora & Caminal, 
supra note 26, at 630. 
 32. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 8; see also Arora & Caminal, 
supra note 26, at 630. 
 33. Acceleration clauses are standard in most sovereign debt contracts. See Das, 
Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 47.  In the event of any missed payments, all 
principal and accrued interest can become immediately due and payable. See id.  
Acceleration usually requires a minority vote of at least 25 percent of outstanding 
principal—meaning bondholders holding a collective amount of debt greater than or equal to 
25 percent. See id. 
 34. See id. at 10. 
 35. See id. at 7. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id.; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 630. 
 38. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 7; see also Arora & Caminal, 
supra note 26, at 630. 
 39. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 7; see also Arora & Caminal, 
supra note 26, at 630. 
 40. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 7; see also Arora & Caminal, 
supra note 26, at 630. 
 41. See A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 997, 1012 (2004). 
 42. See Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and 
Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican 
Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 539, 546–68 (1996). 
 43. See Lee C. Buchheit, Cross-Border Lending:  What’s Different This Time?, 16 NW. 
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 44, 46–51 (1995). 
 44. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 
EMORY L.J. 1317, 1334–35 (2002). 
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the laws of the place where the financial center is located.45  New York and 
English law bonds are the most common.46 
In the United States, most sovereign bonds are issued under a fiscal 
agency agreement.47  When bonds are issued under fiscal agency 
agreements, a fiscal agent is appointed as the agent of the bond issuer 
itself—for this Note’s purposes, the sovereign debtor.48  The fiscal agent is 
typically an investment bank serving as the underwriter for the bond 
offering.49  Fiscal agency agreements do not give the fiscal agent exclusive 
enforcement rights.50  Rather, each bondholder has the right to bring legal 
action against the sovereign in the event of default.51  Each bondholder has 
the right to demand full payment of the principal amount of its bond, and to 
sue the sovereign debtor to collect the payment in the event of default.52 
In contrast, bonds issued under a trust indenture limit the rights of 
individual bondholders.53  Individual bondholders under a trust indenture 
only have the right to sue the debtor for payments of interest and principal 
that are not made on their due dates.54  Only the trustee possesses the right 
to accelerate payment of the principal amount of all bonds and to sue the 
debtor for the total amount.55 
B.  Why Sovereign Debt Is Unique 
Sovereign debt differs from private debt in three important ways.  First, 
in an abstract sense, a country can always service—meaning, pay—its 
debt.56  This can be accomplished by increasing taxes or by diverting funds 
from other projects.57  As a result, it is difficult to determine if a country is 
insolvent.58  In contrast, a corporation’s ability to service its debt is 
 
 45. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 41. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 44, at 1332. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?:  The Role of 
Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1102 (2004). 
 50. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 44, at 1332. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 49, at 1102–03. 
 53. See id. at 1103. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See Gunter Dufey, Corporate Debt vs. Country Debt:  Distinguishing Between 
Liquidity and Solvency Problems, in PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTIONS TO THE LATIN AMERICAN 
DEBT PROBLEM 35, 45 n.2 (Robert Grosse ed., 1992) (“Debt service is defined simply as the 
timely payment of interest.”); see also Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The 
Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 133 (2012) 
(“Even sovereigns in financial distress may arguably have some ability to liquidate assets to 
repay their debts subject to the constraints imposed by their populations.  Greece, for 
example, could theoretically sell the Parthenon or some of its sovereign territory.”). 
 57. See Jack Boorman, Special Advisor to the Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring:  Where Stands the Debate? (Oct. 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/101702.htm (describing the political, social, 
and moral threshold beyond which a country cannot justify further financial constraints). 
 58. See Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:  Statutory Reform or 
Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2004). 
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grounded in the value of the firm’s assets and the burden of its 
obligations.59 
A sovereign’s ability to service its debt may include a similar initial 
analysis, but it also involves political, social, and moral questions.60  These 
additional factors lead to the conclusion that there is a threshold limitation 
to a country’s willingness to service its debt.61  However, because of the 
imprecise nature of these additional factors, “it seems impossible to predict 
when this point will be reached.”62  Furthermore, changes in political 
leadership could potentially change the sovereign’s calculus for determining 
the costs and benefits of defaulting on sovereign debt.63 
The second difference between corporate and sovereign debt is that a 
country can use little as collateral to guarantee the value of its debt.64  As a 
consequence, most sovereign debt is unsecured.65  Secured debt plays a 
major role in corporate bankruptcies due to the belief that security increases 
the likelihood of payment in the event that the company goes bankrupt.66  
Because sovereign debt is typically unsecured, it does not lend itself to the 
use of domestic bankruptcy law as a model for sovereign debt 
restructuring.67  Moreover, it is nearly impossible for creditors to rely on a 
sovereign’s domestic assets in satisfaction of the debt, which is why Elliott 
Associates sought control of the Argentine naval ship while it was docked 
in Ghana.68 
Thirdly, courts have extremely limited ability to force sovereign entities 
to comply with their rulings.69  The traditional state law methods of debt 
collection are inapplicable to sovereign debt.70  Furthermore, there is 
 
 59. See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, BANKRUPTCY LAW PRINCIPLES, POLICIES 
AND PRACTICE 663 (3d ed. 2010) (noting that a company’s decision to enter bankruptcy 
depends on an evaluation of its assets and expenses). 
 60. See Boorman, supra note 57. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Sedlak, supra note 58, at 1488. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See Eaton & Fernandez, supra note 24, at 2. 
 65. “Unsecured debt” is defined as “[a] debt not supported by collateral or other 
security.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 463. 
 66. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of 
Security Interests:  Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2067 (1994). 
 67. See Sedlak, supra note 58, at 1488–89. 
 68. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
 69. See Eaton & Fernandez, supra note 24, at 2. 
 70. Traditionally, a creditor sues a debtor in civil court when the debtor has defaulted on 
its unsecured debt. See 2 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON 
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 20:1 (3d ed. 2008).  A creditor must demonstrate the 
existence of a debt and the debtor’s failure to pay the debt. Id. § 17:1; see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 109 (2006).  The creditor can then obtain a writ of execution, which allows him to request 
the seizure and sale of the debtor’s property. See TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 59, at 15.  
However, the creditor does not need to sue a debtor when the debt is secured, as long as the 
property can be secured without a breach of the peace. See id. at 14.  If the property cannot 
be secured peacefully, the procedure for recovery will be similar to that of unsecured debt.  
If these remedies are insufficient or unworkable, creditors can force the liquidation of a 
corporation through federal bankruptcy laws. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (explaining the 
process of liquidation in bankruptcy proceedings). 
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presently no intergovernmental agency to adjudicate disputes between 
creditors and sovereign states.71  Due to the absence of an international 
bankruptcy regime, sovereign debt restructurings are typically guided by 
the use of the contractual mechanisms contained in the sovereign bond 
contracts.72 
International financial institutions (IFIs) often offer new loans to 
sovereigns while they are attempting to restructure their debts with 
creditors.73  When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acts as the IFI, it 
often conditions loans on certain economic policy reforms.74  The IMF 
often lends to sovereigns that are unable to secure loans from private 
lenders, and on terms unavailable in capital markets.75  The prospect of an 
IMF support package may create what is known as a “moral hazard risk.”76 
The moral hazard risk is the risk that IMF loans will encourage 
sovereigns to maintain domestic economic policies that are fiscally unsound 
and to borrow recklessly from private capital markets.77  Sovereigns may be 
encouraged to make risky borrowing decisions based on the belief that the 
IMF will intervene with funds before a default or during a restructuring.78  
Moreover, IMF lending may insulate sovereigns from the damages of 
imprudent borrowing.79 
IMF lending may create a moral hazard dilemma for lenders, as well.80  
When a realistic risk of default exists, creditors have a greater incentive to 
monitor their loans.81  Conversely, if a lender of last resort reduces the 
chances of default, creditors have a lesser incentive to monitor their loans.82  
Creditors arguably are encouraged to lend recklessly and take excessive 
 
 71. See infra notes 185–96 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 632. 
 73. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1009. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id.; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 642 (“[A] large scale private 
lending during a crisis has never taken place and it is primarily the IMF that has always 
provided the bail-outs to defaulting sovereign nations.  This is why the IMF has become 
known as the International Lender of Last Resort (ILOLR) or the IMH (Institute for Moral 
Hazard).”).  For a discussion of Moral Hazard, see infra notes 77–85 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1009; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 
642. 
 77. See Robert J. Barro, The IMF Doesn’t Put Out Fires, It Starts Them, BUS. WK., Dec. 
7, 1998, at 18, available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/files/98_1207_imf_bw.pdf; see 
also Charles W. Calomiris, The IMF’s Imprudent Role As Lender of Last Resort, 17 CATO J. 
275, 277; Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1009. 
 78. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1010–11; see also Alon Seveg, When Countries Go 
Bust:  Proposals for Debtor and Creditor Resolution, 3 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 
25, 44 (2003) (“For example, if a country’s debt were written off automatically once it 
reached a certain level, governments would have an incentive to over-borrow because they 
would receive the benefit of the loan without incurring the cost of repaying it.”). 
 79. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:  A Bankruptcy 
Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 961–62 (2000). 
 80. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1011; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 44 
(“Similarly, [creditors] would have an artificial incentive to make high-risk loans if they 
were automatically ‘rescued’ when their loans could not be repaid by debtors.”). 
 81. See Barrow, supra note 77, at 18; Calomiris, supra note 77, at 277. 
 82. See Barrow, supra note 77, at 18; Calomiris, supra note 77, at 277. 
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risks.83  An IMF financial package given to a distressed sovereign insulates 
the creditors from the costs of their inadequate risk assessment.84  In 
addition, if the sovereign initiates debt restructuring negotiations or defaults 
on its debt, the potential for an IMF support package may alter creditors’ 
incentives to renegotiate and could cause them to refuse to make 
concessions.85 
C.  Why Sovereigns May Be Reluctant To Restructure 
Their Sovereign Bonds 
Sovereigns facing liquidity problems often go to great lengths to avoid 
restructuring their debts to foreign creditors.86  Part I.C.1 to Part I.C.3 
discusses the reasons why sovereigns may be reluctant to initiate a 
restructuring when faced with a financial crisis. 
1.  Economic Dislocation 
Sovereigns facing liquidity problems often avoid restructuring their debts 
because a restructuring can impose severe economic costs on the 
sovereign.87  Even an orderly restructuring can devastate a sovereign’s 
domestic financial system.88  For example, Argentina justified the terms of 
its 2005 bond exchange by claiming it could not continue to pay creditors 
without jeopardizing Argentine citizens’ housing, jobs, education, and 
healthcare.89  Loans from IFIs, like the IMF, allow sovereigns to postpone 
the initiation of a restructuring by providing needed capital in the form of 
loans or grants.90  While orderly restructurings may be worrisome, a 
disorderly restructuring can make a bad situation worse by blocking a 
country’s access to private capital for several years.91 
2.  Tarnishing the Sovereign’s Reputation 
Sovereigns may also seek to avoid debt restructuring out of a concern 
that it will signal that they are not creditworthy.92  One of the primary costs 
 
 83. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1011. 
 84. See Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 INT’L LAW. 
103, 113 (2003). 
 85. See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best 
Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2004). 
 86. See Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Architecture for 2002:  A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov. 
26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm. 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Nestor Kirchner, President of the Republic of Arg., Discurso del Señor 
Presidente de la Nación, Doctor Nestor Kirchner, Ante la Honorable Asamblea Legislativa 
[Inaugural Address Before the Legislative Assembly] (May 25, 2003),  available at 
http://www.casarosada.gov.ar/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24414&cat
id=28:discursos-ant; see also infra notes 281–305 and accompanying text. 
 90. See supra notes 73–85 and accompanying text. 
 91. See Krueger, supra note 86. 
 92. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1007. 
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of defaulting on debt is the sovereign’s exclusion from future borrowing.93  
Regardless of whether a sovereign defaults strategically or out of financial 
distress, a default transfers a gain from creditors to the debtor sovereign.94  
This may trigger a phenomenon known as a “lender embargo.”95  A lender 
embargo occurs when creditors are unwilling to lend to a sovereign, 
effectively blocking the sovereign’s access to credit markets.96  Once a 
country defaults, it will not be able to access the international private capital 
markets until it has restructured its debt.97 
Sovereigns may choose to initiate a restructuring when they are able but 
unwilling to pay their debt.98  Policymakers may choose to save a country’s 
resources for the needs of domestic constituents instead of repaying external 
creditors during times of financial distress.99  Furthermore, a sovereign may 
be unwilling to enact reforms or pursue the fiscal adjustments necessary to 
achieve debt sustainability.100  As a result, a government may default and 
restructure its debt even though it is capable of repaying the debts in full.101 
Distinguishing between necessary and opportunistic defaults by 
sovereigns can be challenging for creditors.102  A sovereign interested in 
avoiding payment can attempt to manufacture a crisis—for example, by 
overspending—to make it seem as though it is financially distressed and at 
risk of defaulting on its debts.103  Opportunistic defaults enable sovereigns 
to drastically reduce their debt burdens, thereby externalizing the cost of 
default on creditors who face reductions in the value of their investments.104 
Ecuador’s 2008 default is an example of a sovereign opportunistically 
defaulting.105  In November 2008, Ecuador suspended payment on two 
bonds after an audit commission declared the debts “immoral,” “illegal,” 
and “illegitimate.”106  Ecuador defaulted on its debt obligations, and 
subsequently initiated a debt exchange which repurchased the two bonds at 
a discount of 65 to 70 percent on their face value.107  Creditors attempted to 
block the offer, but ultimately 95 percent of outstanding bonds were 
 
 93. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 85, at 14. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, The 
Difference Is in the Debt:  Crisis Resolution in Latin America (Nov. 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/111403a.htm. 
 98. See Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, Do Countries Default in “Bad Times”? 1, 6 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2007-17, 2007), available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2007/wp07-17bk.pdf; see also Das, 
Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 67. 
 99. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 67. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Tomz & Wright, supra note 98, at 7; Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 
30, at 67. 
 102. See Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 56, at 132–33. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. at 133. 
 105. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 78. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. 
910 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
exchanged in the restructuring.108  Ecuador’s default was not triggered by a 
severe economic crisis, and the ratio of public debt to gross domestic 
product (GDP) at the time of default was only 23 percent.109  In contrast, 
Argentina’s public debt to GDP ratio a year after its 2001 default was 130 
percent.110 
3.  Uncertainty About What Awaits 
Sovereigns cannot reasonably predict the likelihood of successfully 
restructuring.111  Despite the enormous sums of money being lent to 
sovereigns, there is no international framework to coordinate sovereign 
defaults.112  This is not the case in the corporate context.  The United States 
has a detailed legal framework for corporate bankruptcy wherein debtor 
companies may undergo reorganization or liquidation.113  The debtor 
company, its creditors, and courts devote significant resources towards 
determining whether the company should be reorganized or liquidated.114  
Sovereigns cannot be liquidated, so reorganization is the goal of any 
sovereign debt restructuring.115 
Yet, sovereigns often avoid restructurings because of the inherent 
uncertainty regarding the results of the reorganization process.116  
Negotiating a debt restructuring can be a long and unpredictable process.117  
Without an orderly international framework, restructuring sovereign debt 
 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See Abaclat v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 63 (Aug. 4, 2011), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC3130_En&caseId=C
95 [hereinafter Abaclat]. 
 111. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1007. 
 112. See Seveg, supra note 78, at 25. 
 113. U.S. bankruptcy law is governed by Title 11 of the U.S. Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–
1330 (2006). 
 114. The parties and the court both scrutinize whether the debtor company’s value 
following a reorganization will be greater than the value of its assets sold piecemeal.  
Although a corporate debtor can choose either option at the beginning of a bankruptcy case, 
most initially opt for reorganization which is governed by Chapter 11. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 706(a) (permitting the debtor-company to convert a liquidation into a reorganization).  
However, the judge may convert the reorganization into a liquidation for a variety of 
reasons, including instances when no “reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation” exists or when 
the debtor is unable to “effectuate a plan” of reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)–(2). 
 115. See, e.g., Rory Macmillian, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-Out System, 16 NW. J. 
INT’L. L. & BUS. 57, 75 (1995) (“Debates over whether reorganization or liquidation is more 
efficient for failing corporate debtors are inappropriate in the context of government debtors:  
there can be no talk of an economically efficient liquidation and distribution of a people’s 
government.” (citation omitted)). 
 116. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1007. 
 117. See Seveg, supra note 78, at 46–47; see also John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of 
Treasury for Int’l Affairs, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:  A US Perspective (Apr. 2, 2002), 
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=455 (“This 
uncertainty complicates decision-making for everyone—the private sector, the official 
sector, and the sovereign government itself.  A more predictable sovereign debt restructuring 
process for countries that reach unsustainable debt positions would help reduce this 
uncertainty.”). 
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has proven to be costly for both creditors and debtor nations.118  The longer 
negotiations drag on, the more likely it is that the sovereign will drain its 
resources and will be unable to pay its debt obligations.119  The process 
itself entails certain added costs, as restructurings typically require debtor 
governments to retain legal and financial advisors for the duration of the 
restructuring.120 
Legal advisors help sovereigns predict possible legal hurdles inherent in 
a restructuring and can provide an overview of the legal characteristics of 
the bonds.121  They may also assist in drafting the bond exchange 
documentation and the terms of the new bonds.122  Financial advisors often 
help to identify and reach out to bondholders and can play a key role in 
designing the financial terms of the exchange.123  These advisors add to the 
cost of the restructuring because the sovereign must pay legal and financial 
fees, as well as travel expenses, while the restructuring is conducted.124  
Restructurings may also create administrative costs because government 
staff and officials may need to invest months of work while preparing and 
implementing a debt exchange.125  A sovereign’s ability to incur the costs 
associated with a restructuring may lend support to the creditors’ belief that 
the sovereign is engaging in an opportunistic restructuring.126 
D.  Systemic Complications with Restructuring:  Catalyst for a Change 
Part I.D explores the fundamental problems with sovereign bond 
contracts that spurred the international community into action.  Part I.D.1 
explores the unanimous action clauses of sovereign bond contracts.  Part 
I.D.2 discusses the way investors were able to take advantage of these 
clauses and develop a holdout investment strategy at sovereign debtors’ 
expense. 
1.  Unanimous Action Clauses 
The majority of sovereign bonds are issued under New York law.127  
Until recently, sovereign bonds issued under New York law contained 
Unanimous Action Clauses (UAC).128  The payment terms of a bond with a 
UAC can only be modified with the unanimous approval of the bondholders 
 
 118. See Seveg, supra note 78, at 25. 
 119. See id.; see also Barry Eichengreen, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, J. ECON. PERSP. 
1, 4 (2003), available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~eichengr/research/journaleconomic
perspectivesaprileditsep22-03.pdf (detailing how countries expend cash reserves and 
increase interest rates to avoid suspending debt payments). 
 120. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 21. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See id. at 65. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See supra notes 98–110 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 41. 
 128. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1014; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 
637. 
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of that issue.129  Consequently, each bondholder has the potential to veto 
any restructuring attempt.130  As a result, the sovereign debtor must 
conclude a debt restructuring agreement with every individual bondholder 
in order to secure debt relief.131 
2.  The Holdout Problem 
Because the payment terms of a bond issued with UACs cannot be 
amended or restructured unless all outstanding bondholders agree to the 
alteration, they are inherently difficult to restructure.132  Some creditors 
may reject the new amendment133 and decide to hold on to their old debt 
instead.134  In an effort to have an amendment accepted, a sovereign debtor 
has incentives to make side payments to obstinate creditors.135  The 
sovereign debtor thereby inadvertently encourages future holdouts.136 
A holdout creditor receives the benefit of a side payment and may also 
pursue legal remedies to recover the full value of its debt.137  If the holdout 
creditor succeeds in litigating its claim, it may deplete the funds available to 
satisfy the claims of other similarly situated creditors.138  Even if the 
holdout does not succeed in litigation, the unanimity requirement of a UAC 
provision enables a single holdout to halt the entire restructuring process 
while the claim is litigated, thereby delaying the process for long periods of 
time.139 
Holdouts are capable of preventing a potentially successful 
restructuring140 and are burdensome on the citizens of the debtor nation.141  
 
 129. See Michael Bradley, James D. Cox & Mitu Gulati, The Market Reaction to Legal 
Shocks and Their Antidotes:  Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 
289, 295 (2010). 
 130. See id.; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 637. 
 131. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contract 
Evolution 9 (Univ. Chi. Law Sch., Chi. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 605, 
2012), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5298&
context=faculty_scholarship. 
 132. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1013. 
 133. The amendment is accomplished by an exchange of the old bond for new bonds 
governed by a new bond contract with amended terms. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, 
supra note 30, at 21–23.  A high participation rate by bondholders is key to an exchange 
offer. See id. at 22.  Therefore, most exchange offers include terms that generate incentives 
for participation, such as upfront cash repayments or advantageous legal features of the new 
bonds. See id.  Another strategy is to allow bondholders to choose among different new debt 
instruments, thereby accounting for differing preferences among creditors. See id. at 23.  For 
example, retail investors often prefer new bonds with no cut in principal and are willing to 
accept long maturity and low coupons. See id.  In contrast, institutional investors tend to 
prefer bonds with a principal haircut but shorter maturities and higher coupons. See id. 
 134. See Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds:  
Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253, 
259 (2003). 
 135. See id. at 259–60. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. at 260. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1014. 
 140. See Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 134, at 253. 
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Over USD 2 billion in claims have been filed by holdout creditors against 
heavily indebted, poor countries.142  These claims often account for a 
considerable percentage of the country’s GDP.143  For example, the 
Republic of Congo faced sovereign debt litigation claims equal to roughly 
15 percent of its GDP.144 
i.  The Vulture Funds Are Circling 
Vulture funds—as they are pejoratively called—are funds that specialize 
in distressed assets.145  A vulture fund is a new type of holdout creditor that 
has emerged since the shift to bond-based sovereign debt.146  A vulture 
fund becomes a creditor by purchasing sovereign debt at a discount on the 
secondary market.147  The discount typically occurs after a sovereign has 
defaulted and stems from concerns that the sovereign will need to 
restructure its debt, or that the sovereign is already mired in a long debt 
restructuring process.148  In the event of a restructuring, vulture funds 
typically refuse to participate and attempt to collect the full face value of 
the claim from the sovereign debtor by litigating their claim.149 
The vulture fund investment strategy is typically to purchase discounted 
bonds after a sovereign has defaulted, and then wait to see whether the 
market rises or falls with respect to the value of the debt.150  If the market 
improves, the vulture fund benefits in two ways.151  First, the vulture fund 
now holds a profitable investment compared to its initial purchase.152  
Second, the vulture fund has a stronger position going into restructuring 
negotiations and will be more effective in holding out against the 
restructuring.153  Vulture funds may also profit by suing sovereigns for the 
full value of the defaulted debt.154 
The United States has heard eleven cases brought by commercial 
investors against the governments of Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, 
and Nicaragua alone.155  The investors have claimed approximately USD 
695 million on debts which had an original face value of USD 195.9 
 
 141. See LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT:  THE CASE FOR AD HOC 
MACHINERY 111–12 (2003). 
 142. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 50. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. at 50–51. 
 145. See Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 134, at 254. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id.; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 47. 
 148. See Ryan E. Avery, Out of the Desert and to the Oasis:  Legislation on Predatory 
Debt Investing, 18 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 267, 276 (2011); see also Seveg, supra 
note 78, at 47. 
 149. See Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 134, at 254. 
 150. See Avery, supra note 148, at 276. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. at 276–77. 
 154. See, e.g., infra notes 160–75, 315–33 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Elizabeth Broomfield, Subduing the Vultures:  Assessing Government Caps on 
Recovery in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 473, 507. 
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million.156  The vulture funds have secured judgments of USD 659.4 
million.157  Argentina now faces similar litigation at the hands of one of the 
most well-known vulture funds:  Elliott Associates.158 
ii.  King of the Vultures:  Elliott Associates 
Elliott Associates is a New York–based hedge fund credited with 
pioneering the vulture fund model in the 1990s.159  Elliott is perhaps best 
known for its successful holdout litigation against Peru, in which the fund 
recovered 400 percent of what it paid for Peru’s debt.160  More recently, 
Elliott Associates has been attempting to collect on defaulted Argentine 
bonds through one of its subsidiaries, NML Capital.161  NML Capital is the 
vulture fund responsible for seizing the Argentine ship in Ghana and is the 
plaintiff in the Second Circuit litigation over Argentine bonds.162 
Elliott’s litigation against Peru163 began in federal court in New York.164  
Elliott had purchased Peruvian debt on the secondary market and had 
refused to enter into the Brady165 restructuring.166  The case went up to the 
Second Circuit, where the court ruled in Elliott’s favor.167 
 
 156. See id. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See Michael Cooper & Leslie Wayne, Publicity-Shy Giuliani Backer Is Thrust into 
Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/22/us/politics/
22singer.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 159. See Nick Dearden, Greece:  Here Come the Vulture Funds, GUARDIAN (May 17, 
2012, 11:35 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/may/17/greece-vulture-
funds; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 39. 
 160. See Nick Dearden, Vulture Funds—Coming to a Country Near You?, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Feb. 8, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/nick-dearden/vulture-funds-
coming-to-a_b_914691.html; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 39. 
 161. Seveg, supra note 78, at 39. 
 162. See id.; see also supra notes 1–9, 159–84 and accompanying text. 
 163. Peru faced prior litigation in the 1990s in the case Pravin Banker Associates v. 
Banco Popular del Peru, 895 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), and the subsequent appeal 
Pravin Banker Associates v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997).  Pravin 
Banker had purchased small amounts of Peruvian debt in the secondary market and refused 
to participate in the liquidation process that followed. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 
129, at 291; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 50.  Peru’s central bank was unable to pay its 
creditors. See Pravin, 109 F.3d at 853; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 50.  Instead of 
restructuring its debt, the bank appointed a committee of liquidators tasked with dissolving 
the bank and distributing its liquidated assets. See Pravin, 109 F.3d at 853.  Rather than join 
the liquidation proceedings, Pravin brought suit against Peru’s national bank. See id.  The 
case was tried in New York because the bonds were issued under New York law. See 
Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 291.  The lower court granted Peru multiple stays 
but ultimately ruled against Peru. See id.  On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected Peru’s 
defense and ruled in favor of Pravin Banker out of an interest in enforcing contractual 
provisions. See id.  Ultimately, Pravin Banker was unable to enforce its victory because it 
lacked a mechanism by which it could seize Peruvian assets. See id.  This is the same reason 
Elliott sought seizure of the Argentine vessel in Ghana. See supra notes 1–9 and 
accompanying text. 
 164. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 292. 
 165. During the 1980s, many of the world’s least developed countries were unable to 
service their debt due to high debt levels, a decline in commodity prices, the appreciation of 
the U.S. dollar, and a sharp increase in interest rates. See Brian Lucey & Svitlana 
Voronkova, Securitising International Sovereign Debt, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL 
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In the wake of its victory, Elliott sought attachment orders in multiple 
jurisdictions—including the United States, Canada, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxemburg, England, and Germany—against the payments 
Peru sought to make on its restructured Brady bonds.168  The district court 
in New York, hearing the case on remand from the Second Circuit, issued 
an attachment order in excess of USD 55 million against Peru.169  The 
attachment order effectively prevented J.P. Morgan Chase Bank—the fiscal 
agent responsible for making payments to Peru’s bondholders—from 
transferring payments to the bondholders who participated in the 
restructuring.170 
Peru then sought to use the Euroclear Bank in Brussels to make the 
payments.171  However, Elliott had already filed an attachment order in 
Brussels and the Court of Appeals in Brussels granted the injunction.172  
Peru now faced the risk of defaulting on its Brady bonds.173  To avoid 
default and the consequences that came along with it, Peru settled with 
Elliott for USD 56.3 million.174  Elliott had purchased the bonds—worth 
USD 20 million of Peruvian debt—on the secondary market for a 
discounted price of USD 11.4 million.175 
The Elliott litigation was the first time a holdout creditor effectively used 
a litigation strategy to gain a disproportionate payment from a sovereign as 
compared to other similarly situated bondholders.176  Prior to Elliott 
Associates, L.P. v. De la Nacion, holdouts had used litigation against 
sovereigns largely as an annoyance strategy.177  Elliott’s success potentially 
altered the risks for all outstanding sovereign bonds because the pari passu 
clause178 at the heart of Elliott’s claim against Peru is included in all 
 
DEBT 135, 135–36 (Constantin Gurdgiev et al. eds., 2007).  In 1989, in response to the debt 
crisis, Brady bonds were introduced as a form of debt reduction. See id. at 136.  The 
Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, Nicholas Brady, suggested the bonds as a way to relieve the 
debt burden of the least developed countries. See id.  The United States and international 
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commercial banks by least developed countries that had pursued structural adjustments and 
economic reforms. See id.  The developing countries issued Brady bonds in order to 
restructure their defaulted commercial bank debt. See id.  The banks would exchange the 
nonperforming loans with U.S. dollar-denominated bonds. See id.  The debtor country would 
have to undergo a number of economic reforms before the restructuring would be approved. 
See id.  Once Brady bonds were issued, they could be traded in secondary markets. See id. at 
141. 
 166. See Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 134, at 256–57. 
 167. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 378 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 168. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 292. 
 169. See Elliott Assocs. v. De la Nacion, 194 F.R.D. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 170. See Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 134, at 257. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 290. 
 173. See id. at 293. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See Cooper & Wayne, supra note 158; see also Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 
129, at 290. 
 176. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 293. 
 177. See id. 
 178. Pari Passu means “[p]roportionally; at an equal pace; without preference.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1225.  In the context of sovereign debt instruments, the 
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sovereign bond issues.179  Creditors could now invoke the pari passu clause 
as a way to hold up sovereign debt restructurings.180 
The Elliott ruling solidified creditors’ holdout power, thereby injecting 
new risk into these securities.181  Elliott increased the risk of holdout 
litigation due to the ubiquity of the pari passu clause.182  There was also a 
risk that hedge funds would begin searching for additional techniques for 
successfully litigating holdout suits.183  Elliott is now utilizing similar 
tactics in its efforts to collect on defaulted Argentine bonds.184 
E.  The Global Community Responds 
Part I.E.1 details the IMF’s failed proposal to create a mechanism for 
controlling sovereign bond restructurings.  Next, Part I.E.2 looks at the 
international community’s preferred solution:  collective action clauses.  
Lastly, Part I.E.3 details some of the collective action clauses’ 
shortcomings. 
1.  A Rejected Proposal:  The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 
In 2001, the deputy director of the IMF, Anne Krueger, cited vulture 
funds as a major cause of the disorderly state of sovereign bond 
restructurings.185  Krueger explicitly referenced Elliott Associates five 
times in her speech.186  She sought a way to encourage debtors and 
creditors to collaborate and restructure unsustainable debts efficiently.187  
This led Krueger to lobby the IMF to create a formal mechanism—which 
became known as the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM)—
to control debt restructurings.188 
The SDRM envisioned what would have been a formal mechanism with 
four key features.189  First, the mechanism would prevent creditors from 
 
pari passu clause is typically understood as a contract provision that prevents the borrower 
from incurring debt obligations to other creditors and ranking them legally senior to the debt 
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clause prevents the borrower from assuming new debts which subordinate the interests of the 
syndicate members.”). 
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 180. See id. at 294. 
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disrupting restructuring negotiations by pursuing holdout litigation.190  
Second, it would give creditors some guarantee that the sovereign debtor 
would adopt appropriate economic policies, negotiate in good faith with 
creditors, and refrain from giving preferential treatment to some 
creditors.191  Third, in an effort to encourage private lenders to provide new 
funds to help the sovereign meet its financial needs, the mechanism would 
provide new creditors with some type of preferred creditor status, 
guaranteeing their repayment before existing private creditors.192  Lastly, 
the mechanism would make a restructuring binding on minority creditors 
once a large enough majority of creditors accepted the restructuring 
agreement.193 
Krueger believed the mere presence of the SDRM would encourage 
debtors and creditors to negotiate on their own and reach restructuring 
agreements without actually utilizing the mechanism.194  If holdout 
creditors frustrated a restructuring agreement, the formal mechanism could 
be used to bind the potential holdout creditors to the majority’s decision.195  
However, the SDRM was never created due, in large part, to the United 
States’s disapproval.196 
In April 2003, U.S. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow proclaimed that it 
was “neither necessary nor feasible to continue working on the SDRM.”197  
The SDRM proposal received further criticism from creditors worried about 
tilting the balance of power in the borrowers’ direction.198  The United 
States favored a more market-driven solution and urged contractual reform 
as an alternative to the SDRM.199  Eventually, the United States,200 the 
IMF,201 and the Group of 10 (G-10)202 supported a complete transition from 
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unanimous action clauses to collective action clauses (CACs) in sovereign 
financing contracts.203 
2.  Heralding a Savior:  Collective Action Clauses 
English law bonds have utilized some form of CACs for more than a 
century.204  However, CACs were not used under New York law until 
2003.205  In February 2003, Mexico issued the first sovereign bonds in the 
New York market that included CACs.206  Since then, the use of CACs in 
New York bonds has become standard practice.207 
Shocks to the sovereign debt market—including Mexico’s financial crisis 
in 1995, the Asian crisis in 1997–98, and Argentina’s 2001 default—are 
believed to have triggered the use of CACs in sovereign bonds issued on the 
New York market.208  The jump from UACs to CACs was not 
instantaneous.209  Rather, there was a shift in the boilerplate sovereign bond 
contract resulting from competition among market participants.210 
Contracts, including sovereign bond contracts, are documents produced 
by law firms that serve large numbers of clients with a variety of interests 
and needs.211  As a result, many contracts are modifications of existing 
templates.212  Industry-wide change in contracts generally occurs in 
response to major events, like the financial crises in the late 1990s.213  
Immediately after Mexico’s crisis in 1995, CACs were used infrequently 
and only by more marginal market participants.214  Eventually, the 
cumulative effect of the crises led top-market participants to adopt CACs 
and to compete over CAC-related terms in an effort to control the eventual 
CAC standard.215 
There are two broad categories of CACs.216  The first type of CAC is a 
majority restructuring provision.217  Majority restructuring provisions allow 
a specific majority of bondholders of a particular issuance to alter the 
bonds’ financial terms—principal, interest, and maturity—and bind all 
other holders of that issuance by the alteration.218  The second type of CAC 
is a majority enforcement provision.219  A majority enforcement provision 
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enables a qualified majority of bondholders to prevent individual 
bondholders from accelerating payment and from commencing litigation 
against the sovereign.220 
CACs make restructuring easier for the sovereign to execute, while 
simultaneously giving bondholders substantial control over the process.221  
This helps to ensure that countries cannot use the restructuring clauses to 
escape their debt obligations when they are capable of repaying.222  Still, 
the presence of CACs does not necessarily guarantee an efficient 
restructuring.223 
3.  Underwhelming Success:  A Few of the Lingering Problems 
Part I.E.3.i to Part I.E.3.ii discusses two broad restructuring problems 
that remain, despite the market shift towards the ubiquitous inclusion of 
CACs in sovereign bond contracts. 
i.  Coordination Issues 
The dominance of bond lending in sovereign debt has created 
coordination problems for sovereigns due to the increase in the number of 
creditors with whom the sovereign must negotiate in the event of a 
restructuring.224  There are significantly more bondholders involved with 
bond issues than there were bank participants when bank lending was the 
dominant form of sovereign debt.225  There are also more bondholders now 
than in the past eras in which bonds were the dominant form of sovereign 
debt.226  Moreover, large banks maintained ongoing relationships with 
sovereigns, which created an expectation of future lending arrangements.227  
This expectation gave lenders an incentive to compromise during debt 
restructurings.228  In contrast, bondholders do not have the same incentive 
to compromise, because they typically do not have an expectation of an 
ongoing relationship with the sovereign.229 
In terms of logistics, restructuring bond debt is challenging because of 
the number of agreements—stemming from both the multiple issues of 
bonds as well as individual agreements with bondholders subject to 
UACs—a sovereign must reach.230  Coordination problems have become 
increasingly difficult due to the bondholders’ dispersion and the expansion 
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of the bond market.231  There is also a high turnover of bondholders due to 
purchase and sale of bonds on the secondary market, which results in the 
added cost of having to locate and contact the new owners before 
negotiation can begin.232  A small country may only have one or two bond 
issues, so the coordination problem is relatively manageable.233  However, 
the coordination problem is far more complex for a larger country with 
upwards of one hundred bond issues and various forms of debt.234 
CACs have been unable to remedy the coordination problem.235  Some 
experts believe another method—which is yet undiscovered—must be 
combined with CACs to encourage coordination among creditors.236  
Publicly issued corporate bonds face collective action and coordination 
problems similar to those of sovereign bonds.237  Scholars have 
recommended a new governance structure in the publicly issued corporate 
bond context that includes the creation of a “supertrustee” charged with 
monitoring, renegotiating, and enforcing bond covenants.238  By vesting 
exclusive authority to renegotiate and enforce bond covenants in the 
supertrustee, this alternative governance structure weakens the procedural 
rights of bondholders.239  The rationale behind such a structure may be 
equally applicable in the sovereign bond context. 
Like sovereign bonds, public corporate bonds are typically dispersed 
among a large number of bondholders.240  Each bondholder owns a small 
fraction of the company’s bonds, so they may not have an incentive to 
obtain the relevant information about the company necessary to monitor its 
compliance with bond covenants, or to assess the types of enforcement 
action that should be taken in the event a covenant is breached.241  
Correspondingly, companies face increased costs while obtaining consent 
from the dispersed bondholders.242 
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The supertrustee governance structure was proposed to lower agency 
costs while retaining liquidity in the public bond market.243  The 
supertrustee would act as an agent of bondholders, but would differ from a 
traditional indenture trustee244 in that the supertrustee would have the 
authority and incentives to execute the functions of active monitoring, 
enforcement, and renegotiation.245  Companies would select the 
supertrustee before issuing the bonds and would have no right to replace the 
supertrustee once the bonds were issued.246  Bondholders would only have 
a limited right to replace the supertrustee.247  This structure was grounded 
in the belief that the supertrustee’s reputation and potential to represent 
bondholders effectively would impact the price of the bonds.248  
Bondholders would pay less for bonds with an unreliable supertrustee, the 
same way that they pay less for bonds with contract terms that provide 
unsatisfactory protection.249 
The supertrustee would be given access to, and would utilize, the same 
information about the company that lenders in the private market have:  
reports submitted by accountants, nonpublic financial data, inspection 
rights, and compliance certificates detailing whether bond covenants have 
been breached.250  The supertrustee would be required to monitor the 
company with the same intensity as a reasonable lender in the private 
market under similar circumstances.251  This standard would serve as a 
commercially practicable benchmark for evaluating whether a supertrustee 
has met its obligations.252 
Supertrustees may be given the authority to renegotiate core financial 
terms—such as interest rate reductions and principal forgiveness.  Even 
without such authority, however, a supertrustee can play an invaluable role 
in the restructuring process.253  The supertrustee’s past monitoring will 
impart substantial knowledge about the company and will position the 
supertrustee to evaluate the merits of a proposed restructuring.254  As such, 
the supertrustee can act as an adviser to and representative for bondholders, 
even if the bondholders must ultimately consent to any changes to core 
financial terms that result from a restructuring.255 
Some sovereign bonds have included trustee structures within the bond 
contracts; however, these sovereign bond trustees were given far less power 
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than the supertrustee proposed in the corporate bond context.256  For 
example, Uruguay included a weak trustee structure to provide bondholders 
with a centralized figure that could initiate collective legal actions, as well 
as distribute any resulting legal award.257  Some experts believe that 
holdout litigation may be curbed by combining CACs with some type of 
trust structure.258  The sovereign bond trustees that have been contemplated 
by debtor nations thus far have typically been geared towards directly 
controlling litigation arising from restructurings, rather than preventing 
litigation from arising in the first place.259 
ii.  A Lack of Aggregation 
The coordination problems that arise from a high number of bondholders, 
combined with multiple series of bonds, may be curbed through the use of 
aggregation clauses.260  Aggregation enables a supermajority of 
bondholders during a debt restructuring to force the agreed upon 
modification of certain matters across multiple series of bonds.261  Without 
aggregation, an issuer must receive approval of a restructuring plan from a 
threshold percentage of bondholders in each individual bond series.262  This 
can lead to restructuring problems both among bondholders within the same 
class, as well as among bondholders across the various bond series.263 
As the number of bond series increases, the restructuring process 
becomes more complex.264  Further complications arise when there are 
different modification provisions governing the various series of bonds.265  
These circumstances force a sovereign to renegotiate identical terms across 
multiple bond series, which can make the restructuring process exceedingly 
inefficient.266  Without aggregation, a group of holdout bondholders within 
a single bond series can delay or even halt an otherwise successful 
restructuring that spans multiple bond issues.267 
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Aggregation clauses allow a sovereign issuer to focus the restructuring 
on areas of collective agreement across multiple bond series.268  Similarly, 
the threat of “cramdown”269 aggregation may encourage bondholders from 
different series to collaborate and arrive at a settlement that is mutually 
advantageous.270  The highly liquid secondary market offers bondholders 
the freedom to avoid what they may view as inequitable concessions 
through the sale of their bonds in the open market.271 
Uruguay was the first sovereign to incorporate aggregation mechanisms 
in its bonds contracts.272  The bonds included clauses that permitted the 
modification of certain matters across multiple series of bonds.273  Under 
these clauses, Uruguay would be required to obtain the support of holders 
of “at least 85% in the outstanding-principle amount of all affected series in 
the aggregate and at least two-thirds of each affected series individually.”274  
Uruguay alleviated investor concerns about the potential issuance of 
“sham” bonds in order to attain the requisite 85 percent aggregate 
threshold.275  It did so by including a provision in its bonds prohibiting the 
issuance of additional bonds “with the intention of placing such debt 
securities with holders expected to support any modification proposed by 
Uruguay (or that Uruguay plans to propose).”276 
F.  How It All Plays Out, or, Don’t Cry for Me:  Argentina 
Since the resurgence of the sovereign bond market in the early 1990s,277 
there have been more than fourteen defaults followed by restructurings.278  
The first instance was Pakistan in 1999, and the most recent was Greece in 
2011, whose restructuring continues to date.279  Part I.F details Argentina’s 
2001 default to highlight some of the main obstacles a sovereign may face 
when attempting to restructure its debt following a default. 
In 2001, Argentina defaulted on its international bonds—the largest 
sovereign debt default in history.280  In the ten years leading up to its 
default, Argentina had issued 179 bonds in international capital markets, 
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raising a total of USD 139.4 billion.281  These bonds were being held by 
roughly 500,000 separate bondholders.282  By the late 1990s, it became 
clear that Argentina was facing a severe economic recession.283 
Between 2000 and 2001, Argentina had three different presidents and had 
depegged its currency—the peso—from the dollar.284  Over the next six 
months, the peso lost roughly three-quarters of its value, the Central Bank 
reserves were halved, and the Argentine people took to the streets in 
protest.285  On December 23, 2001, Argentina defaulted on its debt when it 
publicly announced the deferral of over USD 100 billion owed to domestic 
and foreign creditors.286  By the end of 2002, Argentina’s public debt 
burden of approximately USD 137 billion represented 130 percent of its 
GDP.287 
In September 2003, the IMF agreed to a USD 12.5 billon, three-year 
credit package.288  Shortly thereafter, on September 22, 2003, Argentina 
presented its initial debt restructuring strategy called the Dubai Proposal.289  
Argentina’s proposal was essentially a unilateral exchange offer.290  
Unilateral exchange offers occur when sovereigns bypass negotiations with 
their creditors and design new bonds aimed towards appealing to the market 
while simultaneously awarding themselves a degree of debt relief.291  The 
amount of debt relief that should be awarded through the terms of the 
exchange-offer bonds is typically determined by the sovereign and the 
official sector—the IMF and World Bank.292 
On January 12, 2004, the Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders 
(GCAB) was founded in Rome.293  It was comprised of major bondholder 
groups representing more than half a million retail investors and numerous 
financial institutions, holding a total of approximately USD 37 billion in 
nominal value Argentine bonds.294  The GCAB’s aim was to improve 
coordination of the members’ efforts to negotiate with Argentina, while 
attempting to reach a fair and efficient restructuring of the Argentine 
debt.295  Argentina held discussions with creditor groups, like the GCAB, to 
negotiate the restructuring.296  However, Argentina largely rejected the 
negotiations and proceeded towards the unilateral exchange.297 
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On January 14, 2005, Argentina launched Exchange Offer 2005.298  
Under the exchange offer, bondholders could exchange 152 different bond 
series—which Argentina had suspended payment on in 2001—for newly 
issued Argentine debt instruments.299  The exchange offer provided 
bondholders with three options from which to choose for the structure of 
their new bonds:  (1) par bonds with the same principal but a lower interest 
rate, (2) discount bonds with reduced principal but a higher interest rate, or 
(3) quasi-par bonds with a principal and interest rate falling between the 
two other options.300  This offer was a one-time bond-exchange option on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis.301  Participating bondholders received a 67 percent 
haircut302 in the exchange.303  Approximately 76 percent of all debt 
holdings participated in Exchange Offer 2005.304  Argentina had managed 
to restructure approximately USD 62 billion.305 
A number of creditors were unsatisfied with the terms and conditions of 
the exchange and initiated litigation proceedings.306  This included several 
vulture funds.307  A total of 158 suits have been filed in the United States 
alone as a result of Exchange Offer 2005.308  In addition, a number of 
holdout creditors filed claims with the International Center for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), claiming the Argentine 
restructuring equated to expropriation.309 
Argentina still faced a significant debt load, despite the relatively high 
participation rate in the 2005 exchange.310  On May 3, 2010, Argentina 
launched Exchange Offer 2010, aimed at restructuring and canceling 
defaulted debt obligations dating back to its 2001 default.311  The exchange 
was for USD 18 billion of Argentine debt and offered creditors a 75 percent 
haircut.312  Sixty-six percent of the targeted bondholders participated, 
accounting for USD 12.1 billion of the outstanding debt.313  To date, USD 
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6.2 billion worth of bondholders continue to litigate in domestic courts as 
well as through ICSID.314 
On October 26, 2012, Elliott Associates’ subsidiary, NML Capital, 
received a favorable ruling in its case against Argentina in the Second 
Circuit.315  The court held that Argentina was barred from discriminating 
against the bonds of groups like NML Capital in favor of bonds issued in 
Argentina’s 2005 and 2010 exchanges.316  The Second Circuit affirmed the 
judgment of the Southern District of New York, granting permanent 
injunctions designed to prevent Argentina from making payments on the 
2005 and 2010 debt instruments without making comparable payments on 
the defaulted debt.317  This was a sizable victory for the plaintiffs, as their 
collective unpaid principal and interest amounted to approximately USD 
1.33 billion.318  Argentina has since petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari.319 
NML Capital based its claim against Argentina on the pari passu 
clause,320 the same tactic Elliott used in its litigation against Peru in the 
1990s.321  The court held that Argentina breached the pari passu clause of 
the bond contract because it ranked payment obligations to the 2005 and 
2010 exchange bondholders above payments to the plaintiffs when it 
refused to pay on the defaulted bonds.322  Moreover, the Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s finding that, despite the financial crisis in the 
early 2000s, Argentina could now make payments to both the holdout 
creditors and the exchange bondholders.323  Ultimately, the Second Circuit 
remanded to the district court to clarify how the injunction against 
Argentina would operate.324 
In response to the Second Circuit’s October 26, 2012 ruling, Argentina’s 
President, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, declared, “We will not surrender 
money at the cost of hunger and exclusion for millions of Argentines.”325  
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This prompted the district court, on remand, to vacate a prior stay of 
enforcement,326 thereby making the Second Circuit’s injunction applicable 
to interest payments made to exchange bondholders in December 2012.327  
The district court also clarified the specific terms of the injunction, in 
accordance with the Second Circuit’s instructions.328 
According to the injunction, if and when Argentina makes an interest 
payment on the exchange bonds, it will be required to make a payment to 
the holdout creditors.329  Specifically, if Argentina pays exchange 
bondholders 100 percent of what they are owed, it will be required to pay 
100 percent of the total amount currently due to the holdout creditors.330  
The court found the amount currently due to holdout creditors to be the 
amount of unpaid principal plus accrued interest:  approximately USD 1.33 
billion.331  The court ordered Argentina to put the USD 1.33 billion into 
escrow, and prohibited banks and other third parties from intervening on 
Argentina’s behalf.332 
Argentina subsequently appealed to the Second Circuit with the hope that 
the court would reverse the order for payment.333  On August 23, 2013, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders but stayed enforcement 
of the amended injunctions pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of 
Argentina’s petition for a writ of certiorari.334 
II.  AN INSUFFICIENT SOLUTION:  COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES ARE NOT 
ALL THEY’RE CRACKED UP TO BE 
Part II of this Note discusses the problems with restructurings that CACs 
have been unable to address.  Sovereign bond contracts must strike a 
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balance that protects the interests of both creditors and debtors.335  While it 
is true that creditors can rarely seize a sovereign’s assets to repay defaulted 
debts,336 creditors have had some success litigating contract claims in 
courts.337  If investors are using bond contracts as a way of reducing the 
risk of investing in sovereigns, then bond contract terms may be directly 
related to the ability of investors to collect from sovereigns in the event of a 
default.338 
Some studies have found a correlation between a sovereign’s perceived 
riskiness and the contractual terms investors are willing to consent to.339  
When investors regard a country as virtually riskless, they are willing to 
consent to contracts that specify the interest rate and maturity, but do not 
incorporate other terms that limit the country’s ability to manage its debt.340  
In contrast, when investors believe a country is risky, they typically require 
additional contractual terms aimed at increasing the probability of payment, 
managing restructuring, and preventing opportunistic behavior on the part 
of the sovereign.341 
CACs were embedded in some of the bonds involved in Argentina’s 
2005 exchange, but the clause was unable to prevent the holdout problem 
Argentina continues to face years after its 2005 and 2010 restructurings.342  
Experts have begun to doubt the usefulness of CACs.343  The CAC was 
supposed to provide a mechanism that would enable markets to deal with 
the holdout problem.344  However, the market does not appear to attach 
much positive value to the use of CACs.345 
There is little indication that including CACs in sovereign bond contracts 
has a significant effect on borrowing costs.346  The impact that CACs have 
on borrowings costs should be dependent on the details and the design of 
the particular clause.347  A CAC that reduces creditor rights is more likely 
to have an effect on the bond’s price.348  That CACs have not had an effect 
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on prices may suggest that market participants do not find CACs to be an 
effective restructuring tool.349 
Many experts view the current market-based restructuring regime—
CACs—as “disorderly, inefficient, and overly costly.”350  Part II.A looks at 
the empirical evidence which suggests countries often delay in calling 
restructurings.  Part II.B then turns to the fact that, once called, 
restructurings are often a lengthy process.  Next, Part II.C examines the 
tendency for restructurings to be followed by extensive disputes.  Finally, 
Part II.D lays out the additional challenges that a new contractual 
mechanism must address in order to improve sovereign bond restructurings. 
A.  Countries Stall When Prompt Action Is Necessary 
Studies suggest countries often delay in initiating a restructuring.  On 
average, sovereigns wait nine and a half months after their initial debt 
distress before they initiate restructuring negotiations.351  This delay is 
mainly the result of government decisions and political factors.352  These 
political factors include leadership changes, cabinet reshuffles, and a 
government’s refusal to repay debt incurred by earlier governments.353  
However, the most common reasons for delays in initiating a restructuring 
seem to be aggressive debt policies, like a unilateral moratorium on 
repaying debt, as well as failed negotiations with the IMF.354  CACs only 
come into effect after a restructuring has commenced, and therefore are 
ineffective in combating the delays in initiating necessary restructurings.355 
B.  The Restructuring Process Can Still Take Too Long 
The restructuring process can be lengthy, sometimes lasting over ten 
years.356  The duration of a restructuring is defined as the period of time 
beginning with either the month that the sovereign defaults or announces a 
restructuring and ending with the final implementation of the deal.357  
When a restructuring cannot be resolved within the first few years of 
financial distress, it becomes increasingly less likely that the sovereign will 
be able to exit its debt crisis.358  Sovereigns and creditors alike share a 
common interest in preventing and resolving debt crises in an effort to 
promote greater financial stability.359  It follows that they should be 
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interested in expediting the restructuring process.360  On average, bond 
restructurings in the post-Brady361 era have been completed in 
approximately thirteen months.362  This average does not reflect the 
significant disparity in restructuring duration.363 
In 2004, Uruguay was able to restructure its sovereign bonds in less than 
one month.364  CACs were partly included in the original bonds exchanged 
and were utilized in Uruguay’s exchange.365  Yet, when Dominica 
restructured its bonds in 2004, the restructuring lasted fifteen months, 
despite the presence and use of CACs in the exchange.366  Argentina’s 2005 
exchange partially included CACs in the original bonds, yet they were not 
utilized in the exchange, and the restructuring dragged on for years.367 
C.  The Possibility of Holdouts and Litigation Remains 
Even after a successful restructuring, there are often a number of 
holdouts and lawsuits filed.  Between 1980 and 2010, a total of 109 cases 
were filed against debtor governments in connection to a default on 
sovereign bonds or loans.368  CACs have not been entirely effective in 
combating the holdout problem and preventing post-restructuring 
litigation.369  In fact, the opposite appears to be true.  Post-restructuring 
creditor litigation has become increasingly common and is “now widely 
regarded as a main obstacle to sovereign debt restructurings.”370  
Furthermore, the outcome of Argentina’s ongoing litigation with NML 
Capital could have a drastic impact on the effectiveness and frequency of 
creditor litigation.371 
D.  What the Sovereign Debt Market Needs from the Bond Contracts 
The primary challenge for the sovereign debt market is reducing the debt 
level for sovereigns only when it is politically impossible for the country to 
repay the debt in full.372  However, this determination depends on a number 
of intangible factors—for example, the state of the economy and the level 
of trust enjoyed by the government—and as a result cannot be written into 
the bond contracts.373  Therefore, there is no objective metric that can be 
written into a contract to determine when a sovereign is truly unable to pay 
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its debt.374  This means creditors have no objective means of telling 
whether the government is threatening to default for opportunistic 
reasons.375 
Currently, CACs require bondholders to vote on whether to accept a 
sovereign’s proposed modifications of bond contract terms.376  Yet, they 
must do so without a genuine understanding of the motive underlying the 
sovereign’s default.377  Because bondholders are dispersed and typically 
only hold a fraction of the total debt at stake, they do not have the incentive 
to monitor the sovereign debtor to the degree that would be necessary to 
inform their votes.378  In addition, bondholders may have an incentive to 
agree to a potentially opportunistic restructuring due to the risk of being 
completely excluded from repayment.379 
III.  HAVE NO FEAR, SUPERTRUSTEE IS HERE:  A NEW CLAUSE FOR 
SOVEREIGN BOND CONTRACTS 
Part III attempts to resolve the remaining issues that plague sovereign 
bond restructurings by proposing the use of a new type of sovereign bond 
contract clause.  This clause will create a bond trustee with expansive 
powers.  A number of these powers are modeled after the proposed powers 
for the supertrustee envisioned in the corporate bond context.380  Yakov 
Amihud, Kenneth Garbade, and Marcel Kahan proposed the supertrustee as 
a new type of governance structure for publicly issued corporate bonds.381  
This Note proposes the application of a similar supertrustee structure in the 
sovereign bond context. 
Like its corporate bond counterpart, the sovereign bond supertrustee 
would be charged with actively monitoring the debtor country as well as 
renegotiating and enforcing its bond covenants.382  The supertrustee would 
be selected by the sovereign before it issues its bonds.383  Once the bonds 
are issued, the sovereign would have no right to replace the supertrustee.384  
Rather, bondholders would have a limited right to replace the supertrustee 
should the need arise.385  This is because the supertrustee would act as an 
agent of bondholders and must have the authority and incentives to actively 
monitor the sovereign in an objective manner.386  The supertrustee’s 
reputation and effectiveness in representing the bondholders would most 
likely impact the price of bonds, as bondholders would assign less value to 
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a bond with an unreliable supertrustee.387  The inclusion of a supertrustee 
clause in sovereign bonds, and the use of a supertrustee once bonds are 
issued, would help to address the monitoring, coordinating, and negotiating 
issues that impede the sovereign debt restructuring process.388 
In carrying out its monitoring duties, the supertrustee would utilize 
accounting reports, nonpublic financial data, and other information about 
the sovereign that market lenders typically access when investigating a 
sovereign’s financial well-being.389  The supertrustee would be required to 
monitor the sovereign with the same intensity as a reasonable lender.390  
This would serve as the standard in assessing whether the supertrustee has 
met its monitoring obligations.391  Simply having a supertrustee to monitor 
the sovereign’s financial affairs would address a number of the current 
challenges to restructuring. 
First, having a supertrustee to monitor the sovereign would address the 
current widespread lack of creditor monitoring.392  Rather than attempt to 
force creditors to monitor the sovereign when they lack the incentive to do 
so,393 the supertrustee clause assigns the task to the person or institution 
acting as the bond’s supertrustee.  This ensures that someone is monitoring 
the sovereign and supervising the bondholder’s investment.  Second, the 
supertrustee’s attentive monitoring would make it more difficult, if not 
impossible, for a sovereign to engage in an opportunistic restructuring.394  
While it is true that a sovereign’s ability to service its debt includes more 
than simply financial considerations,395 the supertrustee would be familiar 
with the general state of the sovereign and would be able to warn 
bondholders if a proposed restructuring was unwarranted. 
Finally, the supertrustee’s monitoring function would address the issue of 
a sovereign’s delay in calling a restructuring when it is necessary.396  The 
supertrustee could use the information at its disposal to pressure a sovereign 
to restructure its debt in a timely manner.  This would help make 
restructurings more efficient.  It would also curb the moral hazard concerns 
that arise from the IFI lending that often accompanies a restructuring.  If 
sovereigns restructured their debt in a timely manner, they could potentially 
avoid IFI lending entirely.397  Moreover, lender moral hazard would be 
decreased because there would be a supertrustee monitoring the bonds, 
thereby eliminating some of the risk inherent in the investments.398 
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In addition, the supertrustee could be given the authority to call for a 
restructuring, provided a predetermined majority of bondholders vote in 
favor of initiating the process.  This would be in both the sovereign’s and 
the bondholders’ interest because the faster a restructuring is concluded, the 
less it will cost all parties involved.  The supertrustee’s other proposed 
powers will further assist in making restructurings efficient. 
The supertrustee would also have the powers necessary to serve a 
coordination function, due to its position as an agent of the bondholders.399  
The supertrustee would be aware of and in contact with all the bondholders 
at any given time, thereby eliminating much of the coordination confusion 
inherent in the initial phases of restructurings.400  This would help cut 
sovereigns’ agency costs and reduce the need for financial advisors to assist 
in a restructuring.401  Improved coordination could help shorten the total 
duration of restructurings by decreasing the time typically devoted to the 
initial preparation.402 
Once a restructuring is initiated, the supertrustee would be able to serve a 
negotiating function.403  The supertrustee will be in a unique position to 
evaluate the merits of a proposed restructuring, due to its past monitoring 
and substantial knowledge about the sovereign.404  The supertrustee’s 
approval of a proposed restructuring should ease bondholder concerns that 
the sovereign is restructuring opportunistically.405  Moreover, having the 
supertrustee negotiate on their behalf will eliminate the need for 
bondholders to form creditor groups to strengthen their negotiating 
power.406  The presence of a well-informed negotiator, acting on behalf of 
all bondholders, should make restructurings significantly more efficient and 
faster to conduct.407 
The sovereign bond supertrustee that this Note proposes differs from 
Amihud, Garbade, and Kahan’s corporate bond supertrustee in that the 
sovereign bond supertrustee would apply its monitoring, coordinating, and 
negotiating powers across multiple bond issues.408  This would result in a 
form of aggregation, as the supertrustee’s actions would be binding on all 
prior bond issues.409  The use of the supertrustee, paired with CACs and a 
degree of aggregation across all bond issues, would protect sovereigns from 
the threat of vulture funds.410  To the extent that sovereigns have bonds 
with UACs in the market, the supertrustee clause would give the sovereign 
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a means of restructuring the bond free from the subsequent holdout 
battles.411 
The supertrustee would negotiate the restructurings on behalf of all 
bondholders, who would then vote on whether to accept the terms.  
Bondholders would be unable to holdout from the restructuring because it 
would be binding on everyone once the predetermined majority of 
bondholders voted in favor of the restructuring.  This proposed structure 
would essentially combine the use of a supertrustee with the current 
function of CACs.  The supertrustee would be unable to bind bondholders 
to the negotiated bonds unless a sufficient majority of bondholders 
approved the terms.412  The proposed aggregation effect that the 
supertrustee would have on sovereign bonds embodies one of the purported 
benefits of the envisioned SDRM.413 
The proposed supertrustee contractual mechanism follows the trend of 
contractual evolution in the sovereign bond market.414  CACs were 
promoted as a contractual, market-based solution to restructuring 
problems.415  Similarly, the proposed supertrustee clause would result in a 
contractual, market-based response to the remaining problems with 
sovereign restructurings.  The supertrustee clause could be adopted 
organically—the way CACs were adopted—and gradually become a 
standard component of bond contracts.416 
It is reasonable to expect the supertrustee clause will have an effect on 
bond prices.417  However, creditors would probably attach positive value to 
the clause because the presence of a supertrustee would decrease the 
likelihood of default, as well as the negative consequences of a 
restructuring.  In addition, the supertrustee clause may only be needed for 
bonds issued by sovereigns perceived to be at a high risk of default.418  
These risky bonds are typically sold at a reduced price on the secondary 
market due to the uncertainty of recovering on the investment.419  If a 
supertrustee alleviates that concern, the prices should increase to reflect a 
value closer to the face value420 of the bond.421 
One weakness of the proposed supertrustee clause is that it has not been 
adopted in the corporate context.  However, this is not dispositive in the 
sovereign bond context because there have been a series of reform efforts in 
the international community, evidencing an interest in contractual 
adaptation.422  Moreover, corporate bonds are subject to state bankruptcy 
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laws, so there is less of a need for contractual reform to stabilize corporate 
bankruptcies.423  The supertrustee clause could effect meaningful change to 
the restructuring process, thereby providing the sovereign bond markets 
with greater stability and predictability. 
If Argentina had utilized the supertrustee clause proposed in this Note, it 
could have avoided much of the trouble it finds itself in today.424  A 
supertrustee would have been monitoring Argentina throughout its financial 
problems in the late 1990s and leading up to its 2001 default.425  The 
supertrustee would have been able to warn bondholders that a restructuring 
was imminent, and it would have been able to advise them on the merits of 
Argentina’s proposed exchange.  In addition, bondholders would not have 
needed the GCAB because the coordination efforts would have already 
been improved by the supertrustee.426  This probably would have resulted in 
a restructuring more closely resembling the 2001 default and had a greater 
bondholder participation rate.427  Moreover, Argentina might not have 
needed the IMF’s USD 12.5 billion credit package if it had conducted its 
restructuring prior to or immediately after the 2001 default.428 
In addition, bondholders who attempted to hold out from the 
supertrustee-led restructuring would have been bound to the agreement, due 
to the aggregation power inherent in the supertrustee structure.429  This 
would have eliminated the need for a second exchange.430  It also would 
have negated Elliott Associates’ and other vulture funds’ ability to sue 
Argentina for the full value of the defaulted bonds.431  Argentina would not 
have defaulted entirely and would not be paying other bondholders in 
violation of the pari passu clause.432  Rather, all bondholders would receive 
the same haircut433 and be paid equally, according to the restructuring 
negotiated by the supertrustee and voted on by a majority of 
bondholders.434 
CONCLUSION 
Sovereign bonds play a vital role in the international community.  They 
provide sovereigns with much needed capital and have proved to be a 
profitable investment for creditors.435  Unfortunately, not all sovereigns are 
able to meet all of their debt obligations.436  Without an international 
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bankruptcy court, sovereign debtors and their creditors must rely on the 
terms of the bond contracts to guide the bond restructuring process.437  The 
current contractual mechanism utilized, the CAC, has proved 
insufficient.438 
This Note proposed the implementation of a contractual clause that 
would create a supertrustee role in the sovereign bond context.439  This 
supertrustee would monitor the issuing sovereign’s finances,440 coordinate 
bondholders in the event of default,441 and negotiate the terms of the 
restructuring on behalf of the bondholders.442  The use of a supertrustee 
would help make restructurings more efficient,443 eliminate the risk of 
opportunistic default,444 and curb the holdout problem that has enabled 
vulture funds to profit off sovereign financial crises.445  An improved 
restructuring process is in the interest of bondholders and creditors alike, as 
it would help maximize the flow of capital in both directions. 
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